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The contribution of this research lies in the use of real-world data to test several hypotheses about the role of two signals-sequels and advertising expenditures-in the motion picture industry. The authors analyze the data with a dynamic simultaneous-equations model of the drivers and the interrelationships of the behaviors of movie audiences, studios, and exhibitors. Specifically, the authors test for the attenuating role of third-party information sources, such as critics' review consensus and cumulative word of mouth, on the strength of the two aforementioned signals. The authors find evidence of such an effect both at the release phase across movies and over the postrelease phase for any movie. Notably, they hypothesize and show that sequels and advertising expenditures have a positive interaction effect on box office revenues. This is an important finding because though most firms use multiple signals for their products, empirical work on the interaction of two or more signals is rare. This study offers several new and interesting empirical insights into the market dynamics of the motion picture industry.
An Empirical Investigation of Signaling in the Motion Picture Industry
The motion picture industry in the United States is one of the most critical industries in terms of its contributions to both the economy and the culture. It enjoyed an all-time high gross revenue of $64 billion in 2003 (www.census. gov) . It is also an example of a typical "experience product" market characterized by product-quality information asymmetry between firms and consumers (Eliashberg and Sawhney 1994; Nelson 1974) . In distinguishing between sellers of high-and low-quality products before consumption, consumers in such markets look for credible information that firms can provide using "signals," such as advertising expenditure (DiOrio 2001) , warranties (Boulding and Kirmani 1993) , and brand names (Wernerfelt 1988) .
The motivation and contribution of this article is twofold. First, using a dynamic simultaneous-equations model, we focus on gaining new empirical insights into the drivers and interrelationships of the behaviors of movie audiences, studios, and exhibitors. In contrast to the existing literature (e.g., Elberse and Eliashberg 2003 ; hereinafter EE), our study treats movie ad expenditure, screens, and (expected) box office revenue as endogenous variables and investigates previously unexplored interaction effects of ad expenditure and sequels on box office revenue. Second, much of the research on signaling in both economics and marketing has focused on the theoretical framework (Kirmani and Rao 2000; hereinafter KR) . In contrast, we use real-world "revealed" data to test empirically several theoretical conjectures about the role of potential signals in the context of movie market outcomes.
Specifically, a diagnostic empirical test for a potential signal is that the presence of information from independent or third-party sources (e.g., Consumer Reports) about a firm's product in a marketplace should moderate the strength of the signal from the firm (Albrecht 1981) . We test for systematic empirical evidence of this moderating role of third-party information sources over two plausible signals: sequels and advertising expenditures. We find such evidence both at the release phase across movies and over the postrelease phase for any movie. In addition, although most firms use multiple signals for their products, theoretical and, in particular, empirical work on signaling models that involve the interaction of two or more signals is rare (KR 2000) . In our study, we hypothesize and show that sequels and advertising expenditures have a positive interaction effect in addition to their respective main effects. Although our findings confirm the hypothesized interaction roles that are consistent with implications of signaling theory, we discuss and acknowledge alternative behavioral explanations that may also underlie our findings.
Next, we discuss signaling in the movie industry. We then use this discussion to propose several hypotheses, for which we also provide alternative behavioral explanations. Following this, we describe the data and present the results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings.
QUALITY INFERENCES IN THE MOVIE MARKET

Perspectives from Signaling Theory
As we noted previously, a movie is an "experience product," which viewers judge in terms of its enjoyment value. However, the preconsumption quality of such a product is difficult to assess without actually viewing the movie (Eliashberg and Sawhney 1994) . Even movie trailers that incorporate some actual scenes from the movie provide only partial "flavor." However, studios routinely use market research with consumers to gauge overall quality perceptions of their new movies before release (Turner and Emshwiller 1993) , thus producing an information asymmetry. The upshot is the creation of the "adverse selection problem" (Spence 1974) , that is, self-serving incentives for studios with lower-quality films to claim otherwise.
Thus, there is impetus both for studios, which have goodquality films to release, to provide signals and for potential viewers to look for them in forming their quality perceptions. If a studio's signals are credible (i.e., the cost of signaling in terms of up-front investment and/or risk to future revenue/cost can be recouped and/or minimized through only superior product quality), they will have a positive influence on perceived quality of the movie and, thus, on its box office revenue. The deterrent against studios bluffing in their signals is not so much in losing repeat purchase but in the negative word of mouth from initial viewers adversely influencing the likely viewing of other potential viewers (Kennedy 1994) . Of the various potential signals studios may use, we focus on two that are popular: the production of sequels that use established brand names (Brodesser 2000) and ad expenditure (DiOrio 2001) .
The sequel as a signal. The motion picture industry is rife with "sequel mania." Recent blockbuster sequels have included Matrix Reloaded (2003) and Spider-Man 2 (2004) . The conceptualization of sequels as signals is consistent with the signaling role of brand names that is illustrated in the context of umbrella branding (Wernerfelt 1988) . The up-front investment in making a sequel versus a nonsequel is much higher (King 2001) . This is primarily because actors and actresses command more bargaining power in sequels because they become monopolists or strongly associated with the characters in the film, thus making their replacement difficult. For example, Mike Myers was paid $3 million in 1997 to star in Austin Powers but was paid $10 million and $25 million for its first and second sequels, respectively (King 2001) . This makes sequels "defaultindependent" signals (KR 2000) ; that is, firms incur additional up-front expenditure regardless of whether they default on their signal. This signal is credible because studios will incur this additional up-front cost only if they believe that the quality of such sequels is high enough to recover the extra cost. Thus, a priori, potential viewers will perceive sequels versus nonsequels as being of higher quality.
Furthermore, a poor-quality sequel dilutes the prequel's (brand) equity and seriously limits future revenues from both current and potential licensing deals and from the release of more sequels (Brodesser 2000) . These are features of "default-contingent" signals (KR 2000) , the credibility of which stems from a firm being willing to put its future revenues at risk if it defaults on its signal. Thus, sequels are both default-independent and default-contingent signals and, therefore, qualitatively different from signals that are exclusively of either type.
Advertising expenditure as a signal. Ad expenditure constitutes a large portion of a movie's budget, and its largest share is usually spent before a movie's release (EE 2003) . In 2003, average ad spending exceeded $34 million, and it continues to grow (www.mpaa.org). Ad expenditure is a default-independent signal and is credible because deceiving consumers by aggressively advertising a poor-quality movie can backfire (Kennedy 1994) . Rosen (1993) finds that 70% of movies fail to recoup their costs even after running for a fair length of time. In our data, given the average production and advertising costs ($19.9 million) and box office revenues in the first three weeks ($4.5 million), it takes more than three weeks for a movie to break even, before which poor reviews and negative word of mouth can "kill" the movie.
The adverse consequences of bluffing also have longterm implications. Movie advertisements enable consumers to associate a film with the studio. Moreover, through reviews, movie critics can inform consumers about the bluff, thus enabling consumers to "punish" bluffing studios by not patronizing their current and future releases. Finally, bluffing studios may not secure joint production partnerships with other studios, a popular strategy today given the steep cost of making and marketing movies (Hollywood Reporter 1999, p. 15) . Thus, good (poor) movies are more (less) likely to incur higher ad expenditure up front, suggesting a positive relationship between ad spending and quality inference.
Perspectives from Behavioral Theories
Apart from the signaling research stream, there is also an extensive behavioral research stream that focuses on how extrinsic cues, such as ad expenditure and sequels, influence consumers' product-quality perceptions. Both streams of research recognize that sheer exposure to any extrinsic cue generates product awareness, and only then can that cue influence consumers' product-quality perceptions (Nelson 1974) . However, they differ in terms of the meaning that consumers draw from the extrinsic cue when they form quality perceptions. The signaling (behavioral) approach is "market (consumer) focused" such that consumers explicitly consider (ignore) firms' self-serving incentives and the consequent issue of credibility of product-quality information that firms provide (Boulding and Kirmani 1993) . Thus, signaling posits "rational" consumers who expect a firm to honor the commitment of a signal because not honoring it is economically unwise. In contrast, the behavioral approach posits cognitively "lazy" consumers who process firm-provided extrinsic cues as shortcuts and at face value (KR 2000; Nelson 1974) . 1 There are two behavioral theories that are pertinent to our research hypotheses: cue diagnosticity theory (CDT; Feldman and Lynch 1988) and brand extension theory (e.g., Smith and Park 1992) . 2 Cue diagnosticity theory explores how consumers' use of a specific cue (from the many that are available) in a decision depends on its retrievability and diagnosticity (i.e., its ability to assign the product to a specific category of quality). To facilitate comparison between the predictions of CDT and signaling theory, we must assume that all cues under CDT are equally retrievable. Cue diagnosticity theory suggests that consumers first retrieve any cue and, if it is nondiagnostic, retrieve a second cue, and so on, until the retrieved cue is found to be diagnostic. Brand extension theory (e.g., Reddy, Holak, and Bhat 1994) argues that consumers form positive product-quality perceptions of a new line extension simply because it is similar to an established parent brand.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The signaling and relevant behavioral theories, though differing in their underlying cognitive mechanisms, predict the same positive main effects of ad expenditure and a sequel on box office revenues. However, they differ somewhat in their predictions about interaction effects, which are the focus of this study. Using both theories, we first propose hypotheses about the moderating effects of independent information on the role of signals/cues on box office revenues, and then we propose a hypothesis about the interaction between two signals/cues.
The Moderating Role of Independent Information
Attenuation (lack of attenuation) of the positive effects of sequels and ad expenditure on box office performance in the presence of independent information about movie quality (e.g., consensus among critics' reviews) would be consistent (inconsistent) with their potential signaling roles. We use the signaling role of education level (Spence 1974) in the labor market to motivate and provide an analogy for the hypotheses. Employers base their hiring and salary decisions on the overall quality of each prospective employee, which depends on both observable (e.g., professional and academic trainings) and difficult-to-verify characteristics (e.g., leadership ability). The latter (former) type of characteristics is analogous to "experience (search) attributes" (Nelson 1974) . The presence of experience attributes in the evaluation of overall quality of any prospective employee results in information asymmetry and the associated adverse selection problem. Spence (1974) postulates that education level facilitates a separating equilibrium condition and thus can serve as a credible signal because prospective employees with lower (higher) overall quality face higher (lower) costs in terms of time and effort to acquire a given level of education and greater (less) difficulty in recouping that cost through sustained employment and better salary. Although Spence's (1974) work establishes the theoretical framework of how signals work, it also raises the question of how to test its implications empirically (Albrecht 1981 ) because any such alleged signal usually has a dual role of providing (1) verifiable information about search attributes and (2) unverifiable but credible information about experience attributes, both of which are relevant to product-quality evaluation. Because an alleged signal influences product-quality evaluation through either of the two types of information, the mere empirical evidence of such an influence cannot be a diagnostic test for whether it indeed acts as a signal. Instead, economics literature proposes that such a diagnostic test should be a signal's negative interaction with independent information that reduces evaluation uncertainty (and, thus, information asymmetry) about experience attributes. This interaction effect can be tested in two ways: across products immediately before their respective market introductions (Albrecht 1981) and over time since the market introduction of any one product (Altonji and Pierret 2001) . The latter exists (for non-repeatpurchase products, such as movies) because word-of-mouth diffusion between initial and subsequent buyers occurs over time.
If we compare the previous example to the movie market, as with education, ad expenditure and sequel convey information about search attributes that are relevant to movie quality evaluation (e.g., movie scenes, story line, star cast). An interesting question is whether each of these also plays a signaling role? Critics' reviews provide independent information about the quality of a movie before its release (Eliashberg and Shugan 1997) . The greater the consensus in critics' opinion (positive or negative) about a movie, the lower is the evaluation uncertainty about its quality among prospective viewers before its release. When the movie is released, independent information about the quality spreads through word of mouth between those who have seen the movie and prospective viewers. The higher the cumulative word of mouth for a movie after its release, the lower is the evaluation uncertainty about its quality among its prospective viewers. Thus, if sequel or ad expenditure serves as a signal, there will be an attenuation of its effect on box office revenues with reviewer opinion consensus and cumulative word of mouth. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
The interaction effect of ad expenditure and critics' review consensus on box office revenues is negative. H 2 : The interaction effect of sequel and critics' review consensus on box office revenues is negative. H 3 : The interaction effect of ad expenditure and cumulative word-of-mouth-since-release on box office revenues is negative. H 4 : The interaction effect of sequel and cumulative word-ofmouth-since-release on box office revenues is negative.
Next, we briefly discuss and contrast the predictions that the two behavioral theories we noted previously provide for the signaling theory-based hypotheses. For H 1 , we find that both CDT and signaling theory make identical predictions. Specifically, as the diagnosticity of critics' reviews increases with greater consensus among critics, the impact of the ad expenditure cue on movie quality perceptions decreases. Regarding H 2 , CDT research in brand extension (Ahluwalia and Canli 2000) has shown that negative (posi-3 Because the behavioral brand extension research for this hypothesis uses CDT as its theoretical underpinning, both theories make identical predictions.
tive) information about a similar (dissimilar) extension is more diagnostic because most such extensions are expected to be of good (poor) quality. 3 Because sequels are similar extensions (of successful prequels), negative consensus will reduce the impact of sequels on box office receipts, whereas positive consensus will have no impact. Thus, CDT and brand extension theory make varied predictions for H 2 . Because cumulative word of mouth represents another form of independent information cue, the same arguments about CDT and brand extension theory predictions that we outlined in the discussion of H 1 and H 2 also apply to H 3 and H 4 , respectively. In summary, we find that the predictions of signaling and the two behavioral theories are identical for H 1 and H 3 and are somewhat varied for H 2 and H 4 .
Interaction Effects Between Two Signals
A managerially relevant issue that has received little prior research is the nature of interaction among multiple signals (KR 2000) . In the absence of any existing theoretical insights, KR (2000) suggest that the nature of this interaction depends on the types of two signals (default contingent versus independent), and they conjecture that the interaction between two dissimilar types is positive. By combining two distinct types of signals that involve incurring additional upfront sunk costs and risking future revenues as opposed to bearing either one of them, consumers are likely to perceive a firm's signals as more credible. As far as we know, no published study in marketing has empirically tested this conjecture with field data. However, although not done as an empirical test of KR's conjecture, the finance and economics literature streams provide a few context-specific studies in this regard (John and Lang 1991; Kaestner and Liu 1998; Ravid and Sarig 1991) . We discuss two such studies because their findings and conclusions are similar. John and Lang (1991) empirically confirm a model of positive interactive influence of two signals: dividends and insiders' holdings (insider trading activities); the effect of an unexpected dividend increase on stock price is much stronger in the presence (versus the absence) of unusual insider trading. The former serves as a signal because firm insiders have better information about its earning potential than the market, and to maximize shareholder wealth, they reveal this information to the market by altering the firm's dividend. Similarly, on the basis of some favorable (unfavorable) information, which only the insiders know, they reveal this information to the market by buying (selling) the company's shares. In another study, Ravid and Sarig (1991) develop a model that involves two signals-dividend and debt-and suggest a positive interaction between them. In these studies, insider buying and debt involve up-front commitment of cash, and thus both are default-independent signals (KR 2000) . In contrast, dividend announcement is a default-contingent signal because it is "costless" at the time the signal is transmitted because the firm does not incur upfront expenditure. Thus, both studies reveal that two distinct types of signals interact positively, in support of KR's conjecture.
In our study's context, the conjecture suggests that the interaction effect between ad expenditure and sequels In contrast to the signaling theory-based postulation of H 5 , alternative behavioral theories provide varied predictions. For example, CDT posits a negative interaction between ad expenditure and sequel because if one cue is diagnostic, the other will have less of an impact. Conversely, research on brand extension has found that this interaction is contingent on extension fit and the nature of the product. For example, Lane (2000) finds that ad expenditure does not improve people's attitude toward high-fit extensions, such as sequels, thus implying no interaction. In contrast, Smith and Park (1992) find a positive effect of brand extension on ad efficiency for high-fit experience products.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES Data
We consider a random sample of 175 films listed in the "Crix Pics" section of Variety magazine between late 1991 and early 1993. Our data came from multiple sourcesBaseline Services, Variety magazine (1991 -1993 , ACNielsen EDI, and Competitive Media Reporting-and is comparable in size to that which EE (2003) use. Sequels represent 6.3% of our sample and are denoted by the dummy variable SEQUELS. This proportion of sequels is consistent with prior research (Dominick 1987) and is also consistent with the proportion of sequels in recent years. For example, a check of the movies released by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) in 2000 indicates that approximately 6% of the movies were sequels. We use Vogel's (2001) method to construct a measure of seasonality (for details, see EE 2003), which we denote as SEA-SON. To operationalize movies' "star power," we use the variable AWARD, which captures the total number of nominations and actual Oscars won by any cast member before the release of the film (for details, see Ravid 1999) .
We obtained professional movie critics' reviews (positive, negative, or mixed) from Variety magazine (Eliashberg and Shugan 1997) . In "mixed" reviews, critics identify the movie in a "neutral" light. Greater variance or diversity in the opinions of movie critics increases the uncertainty of overall movie quality. Conversely, consumers will have little uncertainty when there is near unanimity in opinions among critics ("pro," "con," or "mixed"). The REVCON variable measures the level of consensus in critics' opinions by summing the squares of proportions of pro, con, and mixed opinions. 4 The value of REVCON in our study ranges from 1 (unanimity) to .33 (equal splits among the three types of opinions). In addition, we use the percentage of positive reviews (denoted as REVIEWS) in our analyses.
For each movie, we use data on initial ad expenditure, including the release week and the weekly postrelease ad expenditure (AD) from Competitive Media Reporting. Our measure of ad expenditure includes spending on all major media, including television, radio, and print. We also collected weekly data on box office revenues (REVENUES) and the number of screens (SCREENS) for up to the 15th week from various issues of Variety magazine. We derived expected revenues (REVENUES*) by means of the double exponential smoothing procedure (e.g., EE 2003; Gardner 1999), which uses all available revenue information before the week for which the expected revenues are computed. Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) use data from the Hollywood Stock Exchange to construct the expected revenue for the first week of a movie. Unfortunately, Hollywood Stock Exchange data are not available for the period of our analyses. Accordingly, we assumed that the expected revenue in the first week of a movie was the same as the actual revenue.
We operationalize the cumulative level of word-of-mouth communication for a movie as the cumulative number of screens since its release (Vogel 2001 ), which we denoted with the variable CSCREEN. We use the variable WEEK to denote the time (measured in weeks) since release of the movie. The dummy variable MAJOR indicates whether a major distributor released the movie. Following the work of EE (2003), we construct several variables to capture competition in revenues and screens space. Specifically, the variable COMP_SCR_NEW stands for competition for "screen space" from new releases; we measured this as the number of new releases multiplied by the corresponding production budget. Similarly, COMP_SCR_ONG stands for competition for screen space from ongoing movies; we measured this as the average age of the top 25 movies in the previous week, excluding the one under consideration. The variable COMP_REV denotes competition for various audiences' attention; we measured this as the number of instances in which a movie's genre (action, comedy, drama, romance, or thriller) or MPAA rating (G, PG, PG-13, or R) was the same as those of any other top 25 movies on release divided by the age (in weeks) of each of the competing movies (for details, see EE 2003).
Model Specification
One way to test our hypotheses would be to specify a single-equation demand (box office revenue) model of movie audiences in terms of its drivers that include decision variables (e.g., screens, sequels, ad expenditure) of the supply side (exhibitors and studios). However, such a model specification would fail to capture the dynamic interrelationships of behaviors among movie audiences, studios, and exhibitors and thus would produce biased estimates of the role of various drivers of box office revenues. As such, following the work of EE (2003), we use a dynamic simultaneous-equations model. Specifically, we construct a system of three interdependent equations: one equation with revenues as the dependent variable (the "revenues equation"), one with ad expenditure as the dependent variable (the "ad equation"), and one with screens as the dependent variable (the "screens equation"). To account for the expected dynamic interrelationships among the screens, the ad expenditures, and the expected revenues, we treat all three as endogenous variables in our model. We also allow the errors in our three-equation system to be correlated in each period (i.e., week) to take into account that exogenous factors to our model's specification could simultaneously influence revenues, ad expenditures, and the screens.
Similar to EE's (2003) model structure, we use a multiplicative formulation and distinguish between a movie's opening week and its run in subsequent weeks. We also take an ex ante modeling approach insofar as our model uses only information that is available before or at a certain period, t, to model the behavior of studios, exhibitors, and audiences at that time. The variables we use in our system of equations are similar to those that EE (2003) use, except for the additional set of interaction variables that we use to test our hypotheses. We now describe each of the three equations in our model structure.
Revenue equations. The model specification for the opening week's revenue and the revenues beyond the opening week are given by Equations 1 and 2, respectively:
where REVENUES it denotes the box office revenues for movie i at time t and SCREENS it denotes the number of screens allocated to movie i at time t. Vectors of timevariant variables, X Rit , consist of COMP_REV it , SEASON it , and AD it . For t ≥ 2 (i.e., Equation 2), X Rit also includes WEEK it . Vectors of interaction terms, Y Rit , consist of AD it × REVCON i , SEQUEL i × REVCON i , and SEQUEL i × AD it for t = 1 and AD it × CSCREEN it and SEQUEL i × CSCREEN it for t ≥ 2. A vector of timeinvariant variables, Z Ri , consists of REVIEWS, whereas D Ri includes dummy variables such as MAJOR and SEQUEL, and e Rit are error terms. Note that the preceding revenue equations are the focal equations in terms of our hypotheses testing, and their specifications are similar to those that EE (2003) use, except for the interaction terms involving ad expenditure and sequel.
Screen equations. Equations 3 and 4 specify the number of screens in the opening week and in the second week and beyond, respectively (EE 2003): where REVENUES* it denotes expected revenues for movie i at time t. Vectors of time-variant variables, X Sit , include variables such as AD it , COMP_SCR_NEW it , and COMP_SCR_ONG it for both equations. They also include WEEK it and CSCREEN it for t ≥ 2 (i.e., Equation 4). The vector Z Si includes time-invariant variables such as REVIEWS, whereas D Si includes dummy variables such as MAJOR, and e Sit are error terms. Hausman's (1978) specification test for endogeneity and simultaneity in our model, we preferred the 3SLS estimation approach over the ordinary least squares approach. As with EE's (2003) estimation approach, our estimation does not capture unobserved movie-specific effects, but it does account for time-specific effects (through the variable WEEK). As EE point out, individual-specific effects in dynamic models do not usually pose a significant problem.
Advertising equations. Equations 5 and 6 specify the total ad expenditure up to the opening week and the ad expenditures in the subsequent weeks, respectively:
where AD it represents total initial ad expenditure up to and including the release week for t = 1 and postrelease weekly ad expenditure for t ≥ 2. The vectors of time-variant variables, X Ait , consist of the variable SEASON it and also include WEEK it for t ≥ 2. The vector Z Ai includes BUD-GET i , D Ai includes dummy variables such as R-Rating, and e Ait are the error terms. In the absence of existing studies on drivers of determinants of movie ad expenditure, our choice was driven by data availability and general expectations that studios determine their ad expenditure levels on the basis of factors such as overall budgets, expected revenues, time since release, and MPAA ratings, which influence the size of the potential movie audience (Vogel 2001) .
Estimation Results
Using the three-stage least squares (3SLS) procedure, we estimate log-linearized versions of Equations 1-6. 5 The presence of endogeneity makes ordinary least squares estimates inconsistent; in addition, correlated error structures across equations make the 3SLS procedure more efficient than the two-stage least squares procedure (EE 2003) . Table  1 presents the 3SLS estimates of our system of equations that correspond to the opening week and the second week and beyond, respectively.
Results for the opening week. We discuss the estimation results of our focal equation (i.e., the box office revenue equation) with respect to H 1 , H 2 , and H 5 . We find that sequels and initial ad expenditure have strong positive relationships (p < .05) with box office revenues. However, the plausible dual roles (obvious search attribute information and possible signaling roles) imply that such a positive main effect for either sequel or ad expenditure by itself cannot be considered a diagnostic empirical test for a signaling role, because both roles suggest such a positive main effect. Instead, as we argue in H 1 and H 2 , such a diagnostic test would be the signals' negative interactions with reviewers' consensus, indicating the attenuating effect of third-party information on their positive influences on box office revenues. We find strong support for H 1 (p < .01) and moderate support for H 2 (p < .1), consistent with signaling roles of sequels and ad expenditures in the movie market. We also find strong support (p < .01) for the hypothesized positive interaction between sequel and ad expenditure (H 5 ), indicating that the two signals act in a complementary manner in the movie market.
As for the other drivers of revenue, we find that screens, star power, critical reviews, and competition from movies 's (2003) findings. The estimation results for the screen equation also corroborate EE's findings, except for the two variables that capture competition for screen space. In contrast to EE's findings but in line with their hypotheses, we find that both of these variables are negative (p < .05, p < .01), implying that competition from current movies limits the availability of screens for new releases. All but one driver of the ad expenditure were significant and in the expected direction. Note also that, in general, the adjusted R-square values across the three equations are high (.71-.86) and comparable to those of EE.
Results for the second week and beyond. Again, we discuss the estimation results of our focal equation (i.e., box office revenue equation) with respect to H 3 and H 4 . We find strong support (p < .05) for both of these hypotheses, indicating that cumulative word-of-mouth-since-release mitigates the positive impacts of sequels and ad expenditure on box office revenues. As for the control variables we used in the revenue equation, all but one result corroborate EE's (2003) findings.
The estimation results for the screen equation are somewhat different from EE's (2003) results. In particular, although we find that one of the competition variables for screens (COMP_SCR_ONG) is negative (p < .05) as we hypothesized, the other variable (COMP_SCR_NEW) is positive (p < .05), contrary to our expectation. A plausible reason for this finding may be that as more new movies are released in a week, the distributors of current movies try aggressively to extend the screening of those movies in second-run theaters before their salvage values drop drastically (Litman 1998). This does not necessarily imply that revenue per week will increase, because ticket prices in such theaters are considerably lower. The results for the drivers of ad expenditure were consistent with those for the first one. In general, the adjusted R-square values across the three equations are also high (.60-.92).
In summary, our empirical results are consistent with our hypotheses, and they validate most of EE's (2003) findings (see Table 2 ). We find evidence that is consistent with our hypotheses about the potential signaling roles of sequel and ad expenditure both at the release phase across movies and over the postrelease phases for any movie (H 1 -H 4 ) and about the positive interaction between sequels and ad expenditure (H 5 ). However, the findings in support of our hypotheses may also be explained by the alternative behavioral theories we previously discussed (see Table 2 , "Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives"). That is, we cannot unambiguously rule out either the behavioral or the signaling theories as the explanation of our findings.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we use real-world data to investigate market dynamics of the motion picture industry. A key contribution of this research is the use of a dynamic simultaneous-equations model to offer new insights into the drivers and interrelationships of the behaviors among movie audiences, studios, and exhibitors. Specifically, in contrast to prior research, our study treats ad expenditure, screens, and (expected) box office revenues as endogenous variables to examine previously unexplored interaction roles of ad expenditure and sequels on box office revenues. Our find- ings extend the movie literature, which has only partially examined the influence of sequels (Ravid 1999 ) and ad expenditure (EE 2003) on box office revenues. An interesting result of our study is the positive interaction between sequels and ad expenditures. This interaction implies that the same level of ad expenditure has a greater positive effect on quality perception and, consequently, a greater boost to box office revenues for sequels than for nonsequels. Thus, studios can potentially advertise less in promoting sequels than in promoting nonsequels. Furthermore, our study is the first to examine the role of movie critics' opinions in terms of the "variance" (consensus/disparity) rather than the "mean." This finding adds to the research on the impact of movie critics (Sochay 1994) as influencers or predictors (Eliashberg and Shugan 1997) . Moreover, it also has clear implications for studios; just as studios research movies using viewers (Turner and Emshwiller 1993) , they can also conduct research on reviewers and use the results of the likely consensus/disparity among them to decide whether they need to spend more ad money.
Much of the research on signaling in both economics and marketing has focused on the theoretical framework (KR 2000) . In this context, another key contribution of this article is in the use of "revealed" market data to test empirically several theoretical conjectures about the role of potential signals on movie market outcomes. In particular, this research is one of the few studies that empirically examine how two signals interact (see H 5 ). The results support sig- We use these three variables in a third equation (i.e., the advertising equation) and find the budget and the expected revenue to be positive (p < .01). b The results are significant but in the opposite direction. c Of the two competition variables for screens, our results for the COMP_SCR_ONG variable support EE's hypotheses for both the opening week and the second week and beyond. However, our results for the COMP_SCR_NEW variable support EE's hypotheses for the opening week but not for the second week and beyond (the results are significant but in the opposite direction).
Notes: N.A. = not applicable.
Comparison of Findings
naling theory-based hypotheses about the positive interaction between sequels and ad spending. Consistent with potential signaling roles of ad expenditure and sequels in the movie market, our empirical findings also receive support from anecdotal market evidence. For example, evidence suggests that, in general, the largest share of advertising is scheduled before a movie's release (EE 2003) . In addition, two other indicators of possible signaling in a product-market are high levels of (1) total ad budget relative to sales revenue and (2) expenditures on television advertising relative to print advertising (Nelson 1974) . Although the total ad budget typically accounts for only 1% and 4% of sales revenue for search and experience products, respectively (Nelson 1974) , it accounts for as much as 27% for movies (Rose 2001) . As for the expenditure on television advertising, it is typically 1.2 times that of print advertising for search products compared with 2.5 times and 3.2 times for experience products and the movie market, respectively. Finally, even as studios contemplate more sequels, lured by their previous successes, there is also the danger of releasing sequels whose qualities are not commensurate with the signaling role of sequels. The following quotation from Columbia Pictures' chairman echoes the sentiment: "If we held off on making sequels, it came from a desire not to dilute our brands" (implying that the conceived sequels were likely to be of poor quality; Brodesser 2000, p. 1).
Although our hypothesized findings are consistent with signaling theory implications, we also acknowledge and discuss alternative behavioral theory explanations. Because our study was unable to test directly for consumers' underlying information processing of the two extrinsic cues (sequel and advertising), we cannot unambiguously rule out either explanation of our findings. Despite this, as we noted previously, our study still contributes to the existing empirical literature (e.g., Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996 ) that attempts to understand motion picture market dynamics.
We examined two specific examples of potential signals/ cues in the movie market, and we hope that our research stimulates more studies to use revealed market data to investigate the role of other signals/cues (e.g., slotting allowance, store location) for other experience products. Moreover, we analyzed the interaction between two dissimilar types of signals. It would be an interesting problem for further research to investigate empirically the nature of the interaction between two similar types of signals. Finally, we examined the influence of variation in opinions of movie critics on signals. Another worthwhile area for further research would be to examine the extent to which movie critics' reputations moderate the role of signals.
